Ideology and rationality: the Europeanisation of the Scottish National Party by Dardanelli, Paolo
www.ssoar.info
Ideology and rationality: the Europeanisation of the
Scottish National Party
Dardanelli, Paolo
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Dardanelli, P. (2003). Ideology and rationality: the Europeanisation of the Scottish National Party. Österreichische
Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft, 32(3), 271-284. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-60331
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC Lizenz (Namensnennung-
Nicht-kommerziell) zur Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu
den CC-Lizenzen finden Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC Licence
(Attribution-NonCommercial). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
271ÖZP, 32 (2003) 3
Paolo Dardanelli (Canterbury)
Ideology and Rationality:
The Europeanisation of the Scottish National Party
Dieser Beitrag beschäftigt sich mit den Auswirkungen der Europäisierung auf einen regionalen
Akteur, namentlich die Schottische Nationalpartei (SNP). Der Autor analysiert die Reaktion der Partei
auf den Beitritt Großbritanniens zur Europäischen Union und die Adaption ihrer Strategie zur
Erlangung der schottischen Unabhängigkeit. Dazu werden zwei unterschiedliche Perioden  nämlich
1974-1979 und 1988-1997  miteinander verglichen, in denen die Partei eine entscheidende Rolle in
den Bestrebungen nach schottischer Unabhängigkeit spielte. Beide Perioden gipfelten in einem Refe-
rendum: Während die Einrichtung einer regionalen Volksvertretung 1979 abgelehnt wurde, wurde
dieses Vorhaben 1997 unterstützt. In der Zeit zwischen den beiden Volksabstimmungen wandelte sich
nicht nur die Haltung der SNP gegenüber der EU radikal, sondern die Partei änderte auch ihre
Instrumentalisierung Europas im Kampf für die eigenen politischen Ziele. Während der ersten
Periode nahm die SNP eine stark anti-europäische Haltung ein und stellte die Mitgliedschaft in der
EU als ein zusätzliches Hindernis auf dem Weg zur schottischen Unabhängigkeit dar. Im Gegensatz
dazu vertrat die SNP in der zweiten Periode eine pro-europäische Haltung und passte ihre Strategie
an das nun modifizierte Ziel Unabhängigkeit in Europa an. Die Partei erfuhr im Zuge der
Europäisierung einen Wandel von einer extrem europa-skeptischen zu einer Europa stark befürwor-
tenden Partei. Der Beitrag setzte sich mit diesem Anpassungsprozess und seinen Konsequenzen für
die schottische Unabhängigkeitspolitik auseinander. Der Autor argumentiert, dass die Reaktion der
Partei auf die Europäisierung als komplexes Zusammenspiel zwischen ideologischer Überzeugung
und strategischem Kalkül verstanden werden kann.
1.Introduction
This article deals with the process of Euro-
peanisation of a regional actor, the Scottish
National Party (SNP), in the period between
1973  when the UK entered the European Un-
ion1   and 1997  when a devolved Scottish
parliament was established. The party played a
crucial role in the politics of Scottish self-gov-
ernment, especially in the two phases when the
latter was at the forefront of the UK political
agenda, culminating in two referendums: 1973
79 and 198897.2
In the first of these periods the SNP was
strongly opposed to European integration and
campaigned for an independent Scotland to
leave the European Union as it perceived the
EU as negative, in political and economic terms,
and as an additional constraint for Scottish in-
dependence. In the second period, in contrast,
the party was warmly supportive of the process
of integration, now seen as positive and pro-
gressive, and adopted the goal of Independ-
ence in Europe on the grounds that the EU con-
text was a facilitator of Scottish independence.
In other words, the party underwent a deep proc-
ess of Europeanisation from Euro-scepticism to
Euro-enthusiasm. On the basis of a compara-
tive analysis over time between the two periods
the article identifies the determinants of the par-
tys position at each of the two points in time
and explains the change between them.
The article is organised in five main sections.
The first section starts by presenting the theo-
retical framework, contrasting rationalist and
constructivist approaches, utilised in defining
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hypotheses and in interpreting the research re-
sults. It then outlines the methodology chosen
to operationalise the research design, centred on
content and discourse analysis of four types of
primary sources: election manifestoes, party
publications, speeches and memoirs of party
leaders and semi-structured interviews with
party leaders. The following section briefly in-
troduces the SNP providing some basic infor-
mation on the party. Section 4 and 5 analyse
each of the two periods, focusing on, first, how
the party perceived the EU dimension and, sec-
ond, how it exploited it in its strategy. Section 5
accounts for the radical change in the partys
perceptions and strategies between the 1970s
and the 1990s thus offering an explanation of
its Europeanisation. The final section summa-
rises the argument and points out that neither of
the two theoretical approaches, taken in isola-
tion, can account for the Europeanisation of the
party and that only an explanation which com-
bines ideological and rationalist elements can
do so.
2.Theoretical framework
The theoretical literature on political parties
has identified three main models of party strat-
egies: the vote-seeking party, the office-seek-
ing party and the policy-seeking party. Each
of these models focuses on one objective par-
ties are supposed to pursue. However, parties
have long been recognised as pursuing multi-
ple objectives at the same time as well as differ-
ent objectives at different points in time. Moreo-
ver, it is worth remembering that votes have no
intrinsic value for parties, which seek them only
as an instrument towards achieving office ben-
efits or policy influence. On this basis, follow-
ing Strøm, I assume that parties, led by party
leaders, are motivated by both office benefits
and policy influence.
Though office benefits and policy influence
are of course connected, as policy is best influ-
enced by office holders, there is tension between
the two, especially in the long-term as office
incumbency tends to have electoral costs. Par-
ties thus face a double trade-off: between office
benefits and policy influence, on the one hand,
and between the short-term and the long-term,
on the other hand (Strøm 1990; Strøm/Müller
1999). These trade-offs define the specific mix
of objectives that parties pursue at any given
time. In turn, though, parties strategies directed
at achieving a given mix of objectives is af-
fected, as Strøm shows, by two sets of factors:
the organisational properties of the party and
the institutional environment in which the party
operates. The latter, in particular, provides in-
centives and opportunities for strategic action
as well as placing constraints on it.
Strøms general framework for conceptualis-
ing party strategies can usefully be adopted to
theorise on the Europeanisation of regionalist
and secessionist parties.3 From this perspective,
regionalist and secessionist parties are both
motivated by the conquest of political office at
state, regional or local level and by the pursuit
of their central policy objective, namely regional
self-government or independence. It seems rea-
sonable to assume that these parties value policy
influence more than office benefits, especially
under two circumstances. First, if a regional
level of government is either inexistent or weak
so that the only significant office is at state level,
which is difficult for them to conquer. This is
likely to be reinforced, second, in the phase of
initial rise of the party when the prospects of
gaining office are slim and party leaders tend to
be highly ideologically-driven, i.e. policy-mo-
tivated. It can thus be said that regionalist and
secessionist parties are primarily motivated by
the desire to gain devolved and/or independent
self-government for their regions. They pursue
this primary objective within the strategic envi-
ronment defined by the institutional rules and
structures of a given state, with their pattern of
constraints, opportunities and incentives.4  In this
context, EU membership adds an extra dimen-
sion to the strategic environment in which the
party operates, altering the pattern of constraints,
opportunities and incentives it faces. I draw a
distinction between opportunities, which facili-
tate actors strategies but do not modify their
preferences, and incentives, which do.
Furthermore, the SNPs strategic environment
was defined by two extra factors. First, the am-
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biguous strategy of the party between the ulti-
mate goal of independence and the short term
goal of autonomy  as an end in itself and as a
stepping stone to the former  which made it at
once autonomist and secessionist. Second, the
fact that the party operated in a region without
autonomous institutions.5
Putting these aspects together, we can iden-
tify the following elements in the EUs dimen-
sion of the SNPs strategic environment. Start-
ing with constraints, the trans-national and con-
tinental nature of European integration has the
potential, first, to undermine a regional-nation-
alist discourse by making it appear parochial
and backward and, second, the EU context
places limits on the very independence a party
such as the SNP was pursuing. Turning to op-
portunities, the single market reduces the eco-
nomic costs of secession and increases the eco-
nomic viability of a small state thus facilitating
the demand for independence. The supra-na-
tional EU institutions can also be natural allies
of a regionalist actor in the strategy of under-
mining the monolithic conception of state sov-
ereignty and centralisation of power. Finally,
decision-making at the Union level creates a
strong incentive for regional representation at
that level, hence for regional institutions where
these are not present. Furthermore, the small-
state bias in the EUs institutional structure and
the pre-eminence of the European Council/
Council of Ministers provides an even stronger
incentive to gain a state status vis-à-vis a re-
gion status thus strengthening the case for in-
dependence.
It is worth stressing that parties act on their
own perceptions of the European strategic en-
vironment rather than on the basis of the ob-
jective elements identified above and that per-
ceptions are shaped by, among others, two key
factors. First, by the amount of information
about the EU available at a given point in time;
an amount which is likely to increase over time.
Secondly, and most importantly, they are shaped
by the ideological preferences of the actors con-
cerned. Parties thus choose strategies on the
basis of rational decisions bounded by avail-
ability of information and ideological prefer-
ences.6  This article is thus concerned with both
how the EU was perceived and how it was ex-
ploited for there is an intimate link between the
two aspects. It would have been impossible to
exploit it as facilitator of autonomy and/or in-
dependence had it been perceived as detrimen-
tal to these objectives.
It is thus possible to define two alternative
Europeanisation paths for a party such as the
SNP on the basis of, respectively, a
constructivist and a rationalist approach.7  A
constructivist process would see the changes in
the institutional environment brought about by
EU membership  and, subsequently, by the
evolution of the EU system  reaching into the
partys culture, beliefs and values and altering
its preferences in an EU-compatible way. In
contrast, a rationalist Europeanisation would see
the party maintaining its culture, beliefs, values
and, especially, preferences largely unaltered but
adopting a different strategy to maximise the
opportunities and the incentives offered by the
new dimension and to minimise its constraints.
In the latter scenario, the party would ultimately
undergo a process of Europeanisation only if it
perceives that the maximised benefits outweigh
the minimised costs.
3.Introducing the Scottish National Party
As its name indicates, the SNP is a regional-
nationalist party founded in the 1930s with the
aim of establishing an independent Scottish state
outside the United Kingdom. In the 1970s, this
goal was defined as independence under the
British Crown and within the Commonwealth
but outside the European Union. From the late
1980s onwards, as discussed below, it was de-
fined as Independence in Europe i.e. as a mem-
ber state of the EU. Traditionally, the party in-
tended to pursue this goal by gaining a majority
of the Scottish seats in the House of Commons
and, on that basis, claim a popular mandate to
negotiate Scotlands secession from the UK.
With the prospect of establishing an assembly/
parliament becoming more concrete the party
also considered the option of gaining a major-
ity in such an assembly and claim a mandate for
secession on that basis.
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This policy of independence for Scotland
rested on three conceptual points. First, the party
asserted the status of Scotland as a nation and
the consequent inalienable right to self-deter-
mination. The assertion of Scotlands nation-
hood naturally implied that the United Kingdom
was conceptualised as a pluri-national state
rather than a nation-state. In other words, the
UK was a partnership between the Scottish and
the English nations rather than a fusion of them
to create a British nation. Second, the party be-
lieved that the union with England had overall
been negative for Scotland, despite some po-
litical and economic gains, primarily because it
threatened the survival of Scotland as a distinc-
tive nation. Being ten times smaller than Eng-
land in population terms, Scotland was increas-
ingly at risk of being absorbed into its larger
neighbour. Third, the party was convinced that
with the end of the British Empire, with the dis-
covery of oil in the Scottish section of the North
Sea and, since its change of attitudes, with the
EU customs union, it was no longer in the eco-
nomic interest of the Scottish nation to belong
to the United Kingdom.
The party has always put emphasis on its
democratic organisation which granted con-
siderable power to ordinary members in a highly
decentralised structure. Significantly, the party
leader is formally referred to as convener and
has often acted as a chairman rather than a true
leader of the party. The annual conference is the
main decision-making arena and the body that
elects the partys senior officers. Between con-
ferences, policy decisions are taken by a national
council meeting quarterly. The two key changes
of leadership in the periods covered here  from
Wolfe to Wilson in 1979 and from Wilson to
Salmond in 1990  were the result of voluntary
stepping down rather than challenges. A fea-
ture of the party has long been the cleavage be-
tween a fundamentalist wing of those who do
not accept any compromise with the fundamen-
tal objective of independence and a moderate
wing taking a more pragmatic view.8
The core of the SNPs support has always been
the Scottish nationalist vote but the party has
also tended to perform a typical third party
role rather similar to that played by the Liberal
Democrats in England. This had led in some
instances, as discussed below, to mistaking
support for the party for support for secession
while in reality there was a large gap between
the two.9
4.Hostility and Neglect: 197379
The period considered here is the one between
the general election of October 1974 and the
referendum on 1 March 1979. In this period,
Scottish self-government  as a result of the
Labour governments policy  became for the
first time a salient political issue at the UK level
and was put for the first time to the test of Scot-
lands public opinion. In the referendum, the
proposals contained in the Scotland Act 1978
failed to attract enough support to warrant the
establishment of a Scottish Assembly. The chal-
lenge presented by the SNPs rise had been the
driving force behind the Labour governments
policy and the party played a prominent role in
this period.10  In the October 1974 general elec-
tion, the party obtained its best result ever with
30.4 percent of the vote and 11 MPs. In the 1979
election that followed the devolution referen-
dum, support collapsed to 17.3 percent and the
party lost all but two of its MPs.
4.1. Self-government policy
The emergence of the Labour partys policy
to establish a Scottish Assembly after the Octo-
ber 1974 general election created an acute stra-
tegic dilemma for the party.11  On the one hand,
the party was attracted by the opportunity to use
an assembly as a springboard for gaining a ma-
jority of Scottish seats more easily than in a UK-
wide competition. On the other hand, it faced
the risk that the establishment of a Scottish
Assembly might satisfy the electorate suffi-
ciently to postpone the achievement of inde-
pendence indefinitely (Macartney 1981, 18).
The party was split along these two interpreta-
tions of the connection between devolution and
independence into gradualist and fundamen-
talist wings. The latter shared the second view
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of devolution and believed that the party should
stick to the traditional policy of gaining a ma-
jority of Scottish MPs, while the former had a
positive view of devolution and wanted to use
an assembly as a stepping-stone to secession.
They thought that the prospect of the SNP gain-
ing a majority of Scottish seats was, at best, a
distant one and anything that could have made
Scots more accustomed to the idea of self-gov-
ernment  notably a limited degree of it in the
form of devolution  had to be welcomed.12
Though the conflict between the two tenden-
cies was never entirely solved, the party even-
tually settled for the gradualist strategy and
reached a substantial degree of unity in support
of the devolution policy of the Labour govern-
ment. This policy was maintained up to the ref-
erendum campaign in January-February 1979,
when the SNP went to great lengths to downplay
any connection between devolution and inde-
pendence in its pro-assembly rhetoric and was
indeed the only party to campaign unambigu-
ously for a Yes vote.13
4.2. Perception of the EU system
In the 1970s, the SNP had a deeply negative
perception of the European Union. The prevail-
ing view was that the EU featured, on a larger
scale, the same centralising tendencies, in po-
litical and economic terms, as the United King-
dom. Therefore, the process of European inte-
gration was the continuation of the process of
centralisation that had taken place at the British
level and, as such, it threatened to inflict further
political and economic damage on Scotland
(Mitchell 1998, 112113). In the partys eyes,
such nature of European integration explained
why the UK-wide parties were in favour of join-
ing the EU. Billy Wolfe, the SNP leader in the
1970s, wrote in 1973 that it is the aim of the
Common Market to establish political domina-
tion of the whole of Western Europe and to tol-
erate no deviation from this line (Wolfe 1973,
139). The SNP thus opposed entry into the EU
in 1972 and campaigned for a No vote in the
1975 referendum. During the referendum cam-
paign, the parliamentary leader of the party de-
clared that the EU represents everything that
our party has fought against: centralisation, un-
democratic procedures, power politics and a
fetish for abolishing cultural differences
(quoted in Lynch 1996, 35). The referendum
itself was largely seen by the party as a referen-
dum on Scottish sovereignty in the hope that
Scotland would vote against the EU while Eng-
land would vote in favour (Lynch 1996, 33;
Mitchell 1998, 113). After the majority of Scots
had voted in favour of EU membership the party
shifted its position towards acceptance of the
reality of membership while keeping a negative
attitude to the EU. In October 1978, the then
deputy leader Gordon Wilson declared: A mas-
sive re-think by Scots about the EEC may be
needed soon. Evidence is growing that the EEC
is proving hostile to Scotlands national inter-
ests.14  The official party policy was that the
issue of EU membership of an independent Scot-
land would be decided in a referendum with the
SNP recommending withdrawal to the elector-
ate.15
The SNPs hostility towards the EU in the
1970s was determined by four main factors.
First, the SNP objected to Scotland not having
been represented in the negotiations before en-
try and not having been consulted as a nation in
the 1975 referendum. Strictly connected with
this aspect was the issue of Scotlands repre-
sentation in the institutions of the EU and the
preservation of its national status vis-à-vis its
categorisation as a region. Second, as ex-
pressed by the then leader, most members of the
SNP had a negative opinion of the political char-
acteristics of the EU which was perceived as a
centralising, bureaucratic and undemocratic or-
ganisation.16  Third, the majority in the party had
a negative perception of the process of Euro-
pean economic integration, based on free trade
and market liberalisation. This was seen as fa-
vouring the exploitation of a weak, peripheral
economy such as Scotland by the dominant capi-
talist actors based in the core regions of south-
east England and the European mainland. Last,
but not least, the party was also very critical of
core EU policies such as the agriculture and fish-
eries policies which it perceived to be very dam-
aging to Scottish interests.17
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Membership of the EU and the process of
European integration were thus perceived as a
further threat to the survival of the Scottish na-
tion and to its economic welfare. The EU was
perceived as an extension of the UK, sharing
the same characteristics of centralisation, capi-
talism and neglect of the periphery.18  From this
perspective, membership of the EU was seen as
adding an extra hurdle on the path towards
achieving national sovereignty. As the process
of centralisation on a European scale was per-
ceived to be weakening Scotland even more than
the process that had taken place at the UK level
(Mitchell 1998, 117), secession from the latter
but continued membership of the EU would
achieve little. What Scotland urgently needed
was secession from both the UK and the EU
and the SNP policy in the 1970s aimed to
achieve this double independence.
4.3. Strategic use of the EU dimension
This perception determined that the European
dimension was almost totally neglected in the
SNPs campaign for a Yes vote in the 1979 ref-
erendum. In so far as the EU was mentioned, it
was for pointing out its negative effects on Scot-
land. The discourse  or lack thereof  of two
senior figures of the party during the campaign
illustrates the point. The deputy-leader and fu-
ture leader Gordon Wilson, who would be at
the forefront of the change of policy on the EU
in the 1980s, failed to mention any European
dimension in his case for devolution put for-
ward in the last stages of the referendum cam-
paign.19  For her part, Winnie Ewing, who would
later become a long-serving MEP, declared that
a No vote in the referendum would clear the
way for the further takeover of Scottish land
by foreigners () and for Brussels to dictate
the final ruin of fishing and agriculture.20
It appears that the SNPs negative perception
of the EU prevented the party from strategi-
cally using the European dimension to allay
widespread fears about independence and its
connection with devolution. This connection
and the contradictions in the Yes front between
the SNP and the Labour party were ruthlessly
exploited by the No front which centred its cam-
paign on the spectre of a break-up of the UK.
The strategy spectacularly succeeded in chang-
ing the overall tone of the debate on devolu-
tion and ultimately turned what was still a vir-
tual majority in favour of the Assembly into a
rejection of the Scotland Act 1978.21  Such stra-
tegic failure cost dearly to the party in both
policy and votes terms, as seen above. Data on
public opinion provide further evidence of this
failure. SNP identifiers were by far the most
hostile to the EU in 1979 and, even more re-
markably, only 37 percent of them supported
the partys policy of secession from the UK and
the EU.22
5.Enthusiasm and Strategic Exploitation:
198897
The period considered here is the one between
the general election of June 1987 and the sec-
ond referendum on 11 September 1997. I take
1988 as the starting point for in this year two
crucial events took place: the SNP officially
adopted its new policy of Independence in
Europe and the Scottish Constitutional Con-
vention was set up.
In this period, Scottish self-government re-
turned to centre-stage in British politics and was
an important issue in the two general elections
of 1992 and 1997. The 1997 referendum saw
an emphatic endorsement of devolution and led
to the establishment of a Scottish Parliament by
1999. As in the first period, the SNP was a key
actor in this phase and crucially contributed to
the endorsement of devolution in the referen-
dum. In the 1992 election, the party polled 21.5
percent of the Scottish vote and gained three
MPs. Five years later it increased its share of
the vote to 22 percent but doubled its number
of MPs.
5.1. Self-government policy
After the 1979 débâcle and a subsequent deep
crisis 23 , from 1983 onwards the SNP set out to
moderate its stance with the twofold aim of at-
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tracting increased electoral support for the party
and of increasing support for independence at
mass public level beyond a hard core of fun-
damentalists. In other words, to turn the party
and its core policy from extreme to main-
stream. Central to policy revision was the
change of strategy towards the EU analysed
below. The other key element was the gradual
abandonment of the automatism of secession
by making the latter  in the 1997 election mani-
festo  subject to endorsement in a referendum.
As in the 1970s, in this period too the party was
facing the dilemma of what policy to adopt to-
wards devolution, hence towards its main pro-
ponent, the Labour party. After an initial reluc-
tance to support it, marked by the refusal to join
the Constitutional Convention, which was in-
tended to represent the whole spectrum of Scot-
lands demand for self-government, the party
moved closer to Labour and, under the leader-
ship of the gradualist wing of the party, played
a major role in the unified Yes campaign for the
1997 referendum.
5.2. Perception of the EU system
The SNPs perception of the European Un-
ion in this period was radically different from
that of the 1970s. The party moved from being
the one most opposed to European integration
to being, in certain respects, the most pro-EU
of all Scottish parties, though some internal di-
visions remained.24  As mentioned in the pre-
ceding section, the new leadership around
Gordon Wilson set out from the early 1980s to
change the partys attitude towards the EU. By
1988, not only had the party fully accepted Scot-
lands membership of the European Union but
it had turned it into the cornerstone of its inde-
pendence policy. This was based on an overall
positive perception of the European Union it-
self and of its effect on Scotland, though some
of the old doubts lingered on. As regards the
economic side of integration, the party still har-
boured some concerns about Scotlands
peripherality but overall it clearly perceived that
the single market had been positive for Scot-
land. On the political side, the SNP also main-
tained reserves about the EU decision-making
process and the agricultural and fisheries poli-
cies but these were placed within an overall
positive framework perceiving the EU as a pro-
gressive supra-state political system in which
small nations and regions could play a full part.
In particular, in this period the SNP was ex-
plicitly comparing the European union and the
British union and perceived the former as a
positive alternative to the latter, on the ground
that it had different and more desirable charac-
teristics. Above all, as explained below, in the
1990s the SNP perceived the European Union
as a political system facilitating the achievement
of the partys goal of Scottish independence
whereas in the 1970s the EU was seen as plac-
ing additional constraints on the pursuit of such
a goal
5.3. Strategic use of the EU dimension
On this positive perception of the EU, the SNP
built a new policy of seeking secession from
the UK but placing an independent Scotland
firmly in the context of EU membership, under
the slogan of Independence in Europe.25  The
Independence in Europe policy was explicitly
intended to take advantage of the incentives and
opportunities that the EU system was offering
in order to increase the appeal of independence
 hence of the SNP  at mass public level. In
Gordon Wilsons words, I wanted to make it
easier for people to vote for the SNP and for
independence (and) I saw Europe as a counter-
weight to London.26  In the partys discourse,
the European Union was portrayed as a
confederal union of independent member states
and contrasted with a unitary, centralised UK
state with the obvious claim that the former was
providing a much more favourable framework
for Scotland than the latter. In the words of the
partys spokesperson, Kevin Pringle, the whole
concept of a small country in Europe has be-
come a powerful argument for us () Europe
is a powerful campaigning tool for the SNP.27
More particularly, the SNP claimed that the con-
cept of Independence in Europe would remove
the charge of isolationism, would eliminate the
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economic costs of secession and would increase
Scotlands influence on policy-making at the
Union level.
These claims rested on three properties of the
EU political system that constituted opportuni-
ties and incentives for independence in the eyes
of the SNP. At the more general level, the inser-
tion of independence within a process of Euro-
pean integration, intended to transcend the na-
tion-states, removed the negative connotations
of secession, linked to the ideas of separation
and isolation The European framework thus
offered the opportunity to reduce the symbolic
costs of secession (Sillars 1986, 182). The sec-
ond opportunity offered by the EU was in the
economic sphere. Here the key factor was that
the existence of an EU-wide customs union and
the development of the single market offered
the guarantee that an independent Scotland
would retain full access to the English market
as this would be preserved by EU membership.
The potential loss of the English market for com-
panies operating in an independent Scotland had
always been the major economic cost of inde-
pendence and a stumbling block in broadening
its appeal beyond the committed hard core. In
Gordon Wilsons words at the 1983 conference,
this aspect made the new policy a first class
way of pushing the advantages of political in-
dependence without any threat of economic dis-
location (quoted in Lynch 1996, 38).28  The
party was deeply aware that for independence
ever to receive majority support the economic
consequences had to be clearly addressed and
the party had to be deemed capable of govern-
ing the country, as the lessons of the 1979 de-
feat and of the subsequent decline in support
showed.29
Lastly, but most importantly, the party ex-
ploited the fact that the institutional structure of
the EU was highly favourable to the small coun-
tries as it over-represented their interests vis-à-
vis the larger member states, to argue that the
European union would be a much more fa-
vourable political framework for Scotland than
the British union. The fact that small coun-
tries are on an equal footing with larger ones in
terms of presidency of the Council and the right
of veto and over-represented in the power of
appointing Commissioners, in the voting
weights in the Council and in the share of seats
in the Parliament was central to this claim. Cru-
cially, the party was able to claim that only mem-
ber-state status would give Scotland adequate
representation at the Union level when the lat-
ter was becoming increasingly important with
the development of the process of integration
and the Conservative partys self-inflicted iso-
lation reduced the UK political influence within
the Council of Ministers. As the manifesto for
the 1994 European election put it: Scotland
needs to change () central to that change is
the need for a powerful, direct voice in Europe.
An independent Scotland sitting at the top table
beside the other nations of Europe will totally
change our situation.30  In Pringles words, as
the Union level acquires more and more policy-
making competences, it becomes ever more
important for Scotland to maximise its voice
at the European level.31
It should come as no surprise that in its pro-
EU discourse the party ignored the fact that au-
tomatic EU membership for a seceding Scot-
land was far from assured and that the process
of integration itself had the potential to run coun-
ter to nationalist aspirations. If, on the one hand,
the EU was lowering the economic, political and
symbolic costs of secession it was, on the other
hand, also threatening the very national sover-
eignty that the party wanted to achieve for Scot-
land.32
Despite the inherent tensions, critics would
say contradictions, in the SNPs position, the
partys strategy was markedly more successful
in the 1990s than in the 1970s. In particular, it
produced three main effects. First, it shifted the
preference distribution at mass public level to-
wards the independence end of the spectrum and
threatened to polarise competition between the
latter and the status quo leaving the assembly
option looking like an empty centre. This shift
forced the Labour party to react and to move
closer to the SNPs position. However, the In-
dependence in Europe option also represented
a moderation or a mainstreaming of the
SNPs position which had the overall effect of
narrowing the policy distance between the lat-
ter and Labour. Second, this rapprochement
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acted as a powerful factor of unity within the
pro-self-government front, enabling it  in sharp
contrast to the 1979 situation  to present a
united face and to campaign jointly for the en-
dorsement of devolution in the referendum
(McCrone/Lewis 1999, 27). The appeal of the
Independence in Europe option  in 1997 the
second most popular constitutional preference
 and the unitary campaign of the Yes front were
the two most important determinants of the ref-
erendum result in 1997. 33  Thirdly, by exploit-
ing the opportunities and incentives that the EU
context was offering, the party was instrumen-
tal in opening a European dimension to the poli-
tics of self-government and to force the other
parties to compete in that dimension. Given that
by the 1990s support for Scottish self-govern-
ment was associated to support for European
integration, the new spatial configuration of
competition gave a structural advantage to the
pro-self-government front; a neat reversal of the
1979 situation.34
However, it is also important to point out that
the SNPs success was more evident in policy
terms than in votes terms. As mentioned above,
the partys preferred constitutional status for
Scotland  Independence in Europe  became
the second most popular option with 26 per cent
support across the electorate and 54 among SNP
identifiers, thus producing a radical shift in the
preference distribution at mass public level.35
This, in turn, was crucial in making devolution
endorsed in the referendum. On the other hand,
the SNPs share of the vote in Scotland or the
percentage of voters identifying with the party
did not increase in any comparable way. Identi-
fication with the SNP only rose from 10 to 18
percent between 1979 and 1997 while electoral
support went from 17 to 22 percent. If the SNP
managed to become the second party in Scot-
land and thus the effective opposition to Labour,
this was due more to the collapse in support for
the Conservative party than to any dramatic
upsurge in the nationalist vote. Though, it is also
true that the establishment of a Scottish parlia-
ment itself, of course, provided a natural avenue
for the further consolidation of the SNP as Scot-
lands second party. This differential in the par-
tys fortunes between policy and votes has
been observed in relation to other cases of
prominent regionalist parties and can be con-
ceptualised as an inherent strategic dilemma for
parties whose principal raison dêtre is a change
in the constitutional status of their region. Re-
gionalist parties face a very significant risk that
mainstream competitors can steal the central
point in their platforms and thus make them, to
paraphrase Newman, win the policy wars but
lose the electoral battles (Newman 1995; see
also de Winter 1998, 238240).
6.Explaining the Europeanisation of the
 SNP
How can this radical shift in attitudes and in
strategies be explained? Three groups of sig-
nificant factors can be identified: in the UK sys-
tem, at the EU level and within the party.
6.1. Changes in the UK system
After the 1979 referendum and the general
election, the Thatcher-led Conservative govern-
ments moved the policy output of the UK sys-
tem significantly rightwards by aggressively
reforming social, regional and fiscal policies.36
Furthermore, they also embarked on a process
of re-centralisation, marked in particular by the
emasculation of local government and explicit
opposition to the idea of regional government.
Any suggestion of home rule for Scotland was
rejected on the same grounds. These changes
inevitably affected the nature of the union be-
tween Scotland and England as the traditional
understanding of the UK as a union-state ap-
peared to be under threat.37  Furthermore, they
also moved the policy output and the institu-
tional structure of the UK further away from
the preferences of the SNP  and of the median
Scottish voter  thus allowing the party to por-
tray the UK political system as hostile to Scot-
tish interests. On the basis of the connection
between perception of the system and its strate-
gic exploitation discussed above, the increas-
ing negativity of the UK facilitated the par-
tys case for Scotland to secede from it.
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6.2. Changes at the EU level
The EU changed significantly between 1979
and 1997. First of all, the level of economic in-
tegration in the EUs internal market deepened
as a result of the single market programme which
eliminated most technical barriers to cross-bor-
der trade and increased the ease of movement
for both capital and labour. A more deeply inte-
grated internal market provided higher guaran-
tees for maintaining cross-border economic ac-
tivities, which had particular relevance to the
scenario in which a border could be established
between Scotland and the rest of the UK. In
other words, the deepening of economic inte-
gration further reduced the economic costs as-
sociated with secession. Moreover, negative
predictions about the impact of economic inte-
gration on Scotland failed to materialise and, as
integration deepened, Scotland appeared to
profit from the inflow of foreign direct invest-
ments, especially from US companies. Kevin
Pringle summarises the SNPs turnaround on
this point as such: There are substantial eco-
nomic benefits for Scotland to gain from mem-
bership of Europe.38
Second, political integration also deepened
considerably with EU competences expanding
into policy areas hitherto reserved to the states.
This deepening of political integration raised the
importance of the EU as a decision-making fo-
rum and thus raised the salience of the repre-
sentation of Scottish interests within it. Given
the continuing pre-eminence of the Council,
such an incentive affected especially the option
of independent self-government vis-à-vis de-
volved self-government. The expectations that
regions could play a significant role in EU
policy-making quickly died out after the Com-
mittee of the Regions had been set up in 1994,
thus facilitating the SNPs strategy of stressing
the attractiveness of a state status vis-à-vis a
region status for Scotland.
Thirdly, the shift to direct election for the
European Parliament offered the SNP the op-
portunity to be directly represented at the EU
level and in a forum that displayed a great deal
of understanding for the partys cause. Through
the election of one of the partys most promi-
nent leaders in 1979 an organic link was es-
tablished between the party and the European
forum par excellence. This contributed signifi-
cantly to making the EU appear a friendly sys-
tem in the eyes of the party.
Lastly, but most importantly, the European
Union developed substantial social and regional
policies which moved the policy output of the
Union leftwards and which contributed signifi-
cantly to dispel its image as a purely laissez faire,
capitalist organisation. Scotland became a ma-
jor beneficiary of the structural funds, especially
those targeted to areas in industrial decline,
which were just born in the late 1970s but com-
manded over 30 percent of the EU budget in
the 1990s. For economic and political reasons
 Scotlands peripherality and de-industrialisa-
tion together with the left-leaning preferences
of the SNPs constituency  these policies were
popular in the Scottish society as a whole and
among nationalists in particular and their promi-
nence could compensate for unpopular aspects
of the EU such as the fisheries policy.39  As for
the previous points, these institutional and policy
changes at the European level went a long way
towards changing the perception the party had
of the EU, especially in contrast to the UK.
Building on this new perception of the EU as
a positive institutional environment for Scotland
 and an even more so one for an independent
Scotland  the SNP was then able to fully ex-
ploit it in its strategy to boost support for inde-
pendence and for itself. It would have been im-
possible for the party to make a success of its
Independence in Europe strategy had Europe
still been perceived in negative terms by the
party members and the wider Scottish society.
6.3. Changes within the party
Two main changes took place within the party
itself. Jim Sillars, a former Labour MP and most
prominent advocate of a European dimension
to Scottish self-government, joined the SNP af-
ter his Scottish Labour party foundered in the
1979 election and played a crucial role in per-
suading the party that the European Union
framework could be exploited to increase sup-
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port for independence.40  More significantly, two
prominent figures such as Gordon Wilson and
Winnie Ewing abandoned their sharp hostility
towards the EU and were instrumental in mov-
ing the party towards acceptance of the EU first
and towards embracing the policy of Independ-
ence in Europe later. In 1979, the former be-
came party leader while the latter  perhaps the
most charismatic figure in the party  became
MEP for the Highlands and Islands constituency.
Both Wilson and Ewing changed their posi-
tions in the wake of the 1979 referendum
debâcle and the subsequent collapse in the par-
tys support but their conversion was also part
of a broader ideological revision in respect of
the conception of national sovereignty and the
role of government in the economy. National
sovereignty ceased to be conceptualised as a
monolithic, zero-sum entity and the idea that it
could be pooled or vertically segmented with-
out relinquishing it became widely accepted. It
was seen as part of the process of
mainstreaming the party, which entailed the
abandonment of the ideal of building a semi-
autarkic 19th century nation-state and which
made possible the shift away from the
maximalist position of secession from the UK
and the EU.41 As regards the role of government
in the economy, the revision led to the accept-
ance of a liberal economic constitution in
which economic activities are left to market ac-
tors and the governments role is confined to
regulating the market.42  Like the other factors
analysed above, this ideological revision made
both the EU and a limited independence for
Scotland acceptable to the party and thus opened
the way for their use in the party strategy.
Two interactions between these factors, in
particular, appear to have been decisive in
changing the SNPs perception of the EU and
determining its decision to exploit it strategi-
cally. First, the systemic shift between the po-
sition of the UK and the EU systems relative to
Scotlands modified the whole institutional con-
text in which the politics of self-government was
framed. By bringing the EU system closer to
the preferences of the median Scottish voter than
the UKs, it made the European union more
attractive than the British union with the re-
sulting impact on the attractiveness of the In-
dependence in Europe option. Second, the
1980s ideological revision  prominently dis-
played in the case of two senior leaders of the
party  cleared the ideological fog that pre-
vented the party from seeing how the European
Union could facilitate their strategies. It thus
made visible from the late1980s onwards what
the ideological fog had kept hidden from them
in 1979.
7.Conclusions
It seems already clear that neither a rational-
ist nor a constructivist interpretation, on their
own, can account for the Europeanisation of the
SNP analysed above, though on balance the
former seems to be able to explain much more
than the latter.
There is some evidence that a constructivist
dynamics was at play, especially in the con-
version of a prominent leader such as Winnie
Ewing after her election to the European Par-
liament. It is plausible that the change in Ew-
ings perceptions and preferences was the re-
sult of her being exposed to European culture
and norms as part of a process of institutional
learning as an MEP. Also, the partys greater
familiarity with the EU system probably con-
tributed to the acceptability of independence
within a system of multi-level governance for a
nation such as Scotland. However, the overall
change in the partys perception of the EU had
little to do with the learning of norms and val-
ues but was determined by the broad ideologi-
cal revision of the left-of-centre opinion across
Europe and, especially, by the systemic shift
brought about by the EU system moving closer
to Scotland while the UK moved away.
In contrast, the decision to change the dis-
course on the EU and campaign on Independ-
ence in Europe was in many respects a cold,
rational move on the part of the SNP based on a
careful calculation that the benefits from the
move would outweigh its potential costs. The
new policy allowed the party to claim that the
political and economic costs of secession had
almost disappeared while the constraints on
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Scotlands independence would be minimal.43
While the partys preferences changed only
slightly, the strategy was radically different. On
the other hand, the key features of the EU sys-
tem the party decided to exploit in the 1990s 
customs union, confederal nature, small states
bias  were already present in 1979.44  The fact
that the SNP did not exploit them at that time
clearly indicates a failure of rationality which
appears due to imperfect information and, es-
pecially, to ideological blinkers.
Two broader points suggest themselves. First,
the EU political system possesses properties that
have the potential to affect the demand for self-
government at the regional level, in other words
to Europeanise them. These properties are both
static, related to those features of the EU that
are relatively fixed, and dynamic, related to
those features produced by the process of inte-
gration over time. Actors demanding regional
self-government are liable to be Europeanised
because these properties of the EU system offer
incentives and opportunities to them  as well
as placing constraints  which alter the benefits/
costs balance for the actor and influence its stra-
tegic action. On balance incentives and oppor-
tunities outweigh constraints thus making
Europeanisation  under certain conditions45  
a potentially empowering influence on region-
alist actors. This theoretical conclusion is con-
sistent with the empirical evidence that several
other regionalist parties also abandoned their
Euro-scepticism over the same period analysed
here (de Winter 1998).
Second, adapting the well-known concept of
goodness of fit (Risse et al. 2001) to the case
of regionalist actors, it can be said that the
potential for Europeanisation depends on two
variables: distance from the state and distance
from the EU. By distance I mean the gap
between the institutional features and the pol-
icy output of the state and the EU, respectively,
and the median preferences in the region
demanding self-government. The potential for
Europeanisation can be thus theorised as such:
the smaller the distance from Europe and the
larger the distance from the state, the higher the
incentives and opportunities offered to region-
alist actors to exploit the European dimension
in their strategies to achieve self-government
hence the stronger the Europeanisation of the
latter.
NOTES
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1 For the sake of consistency and simplicity, I use the
terms European Union and EU to refer to both the
present EU and what in the 1970s was variously
called the E.E.C., the European Communities and
the Common Market.
2 In the March 1979 referendum a Scottish assembly
failed to gain enough support while in September
1997 a Scottish parliament was strongly endorsed.
3 I use the terms regionalist, devolutionist, devolution
to refer to regional autonomy within the framework
of the existing state and the terms secessionist, se-
cession, independence to refer to the creation of a
separate state.
4 The organisational factors affecting party strategies
are not analysed in detail here as the focus of the
article is on the transformation of the institutional
environment.
5 Though elaborating on these points is beyond the
scope of this article, the strategic environment is dif-
ferent for a secessionist party relative to a regionalist
party and, moreover, in a region without autonomous
institutions relative to a region that already has them:
see Dardanelli (2002, chs 2; 8).
6 For a fuller discussion of the application of the as-
sumptions of bounded rationality to the topic dealt
with in this article, see Dardanelli (2002, 5254).
7 For a discussion of rationalist and constructivist ap-
proaches in the study of the EU, see Aspinwall and
Schneider (2000).
8 On the partys organisation, see Bennie et al. (1997,
7880) and Newell (1998); on factionalism, see
Mitchell (1990b).
9 See Jaensch (1976) and Miller et al. (1977).
10 For an introduction to the politics of Scottish devo-
lution, see Bogdanor (1999).
11 On the SNP policy towards devolution in the 1970s,
see Levy (1986) and Kauppi (1982).
12 On the conflict within the party on devolution before
and after the referendum, see Kauppi (1982, 333
334).
13 Naturally, the party was still seeing the assembly as
a springboard for secession but avoided saying so as
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it was aware that it would scare many moderate devo-
lutionists into voting No.
14 Scottish National Party Archive, Acc 10754/27.
15 Choose Scotland  The Challenge of Independence
(1979, 11).
16 Wolfe and Wilson, interviews with the author.
17 Wilson, interview with the author; see also Lynch
(1996, 30).
18 See press releases by Gordon Wilson, Douglas Hen-
derson, George Reid, Hamish Watt and Winnie Ewing
between 21 October 1978 and 28 February 1979 in
Scottish National Party Archive, Acc 10754/27.
19 Gordon Wilson, Assembly would give better value
for taxpayers money, The Courier and Advertiser,
26 February 1979.
20 As reported in Yes vote would be sign of confidence,
The Scotsman, 7 February 1979.
21 See wider discussion in Dardanelli (2002, 266268).
22 Ibid. (351; 335).
23 On the post-1979 crisis within the party, see Kauppi
(1982) and Mitchell (1990b).
24 The attitude towards the EU was one of the internal
cleavages in the party between gradualists and fun-
damentalists, see Mitchell (1990b).
25 On the adoption of the Independence in Europe
policy, see Macartney (1990) and Lynch (1996, 37
49).
26 Interview with the author; Cunningham, interview
with the author, expressed the same perception of
the EU as a facilitator of independence.
27 Interview with the author. See also SNPower for
Change (1994, 4; 89).
28 See also Sillars (1986, 184186) and SNPower for
Change (1994, 67).
29 On the need to address the economic aspects of se-
cession and on the abandonment of a 19th century
idea of nation-state, see Sillars (1986, 182).
30 SNPower for Change (1994, 2).
31 Interview with the author. Wilson and Wolfe, inter-
views with the author, expressed similar views.
32 On the legal problems raised by a seceding Scotland
with regard to EU membership, see Lane (1991). For
an articulate internal critique of the Independence
in Europe policy, see Lindsay (1991). Even those in
favour of the policy are fully aware of the existence
of such a trade-off, Wilson and Cunningham, inter-
views with the author. See also SNPower for Change
(1994, 19) and Lynch (1996).
33 See wider discussion in Dardanelli (2002, 273275).
34 Ibid. (esp. chs 36).
35 Ibid. (341).
36 The poll tax was the most extreme example of that
trend, for its effect on Scotland, see McCrone (1991)
and Barker (1992).
37 On the changed approach to the British union on the
part of the Conservative party, see Mitchell (1990a;
1996) and Seawright (1996).
38 Interview with the author.
39 Cunningham, interview with the author, pointed out
that the development of a social policy made the EU
relevant for many ordinary working-class Scots for
the first time. On the ongoing problems with the fish-
eries policy, see Wright (1996).
40 On the role of Ewing and Sillars, see also Lynch
(1996, 3739).
41 Cunningham, interview with the author.
42 This change mirrored the wider change in the Lefts
attitudes towards the European Union across Europe,
see Hix (1999) and Ladrech (2000).
43 For all its enthusiasm for Europe the party never
went beyond a confederal vision for the EU, reject-
ing a federal scenario in which Scotlands nation-
hood might be threatened.
44 Vice-versa, two of the most hated policies of the
1970s  agriculture and fisheries  survived more or
less unchanged into the 1990s.
45 See the discussion in Dardanelli (2002, 289296) for
an elaboration of these conditions.
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